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Preventive Peacemaking in Macedonia:  
An Assessment of U.N. Good Offices Diplomacy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In March of 2001, ethnic Albanian rebels launched Macedonia1 
into a violent civil conflict that made the international community 
hold its breath at the prospect of a new Balkan war. Until the 
hostilities of 2001, Macedonia had managed to remain virtually 
unsullied by the violent ethnic conflicts of its Balkan sister states. In 
part, Macedonia’s success was due to recognition by the United 
Nations (“UN”), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (“OSCE”), and other international actors of the fragile 
ethnic situation in Macedonia after the dissolution of the 
Communist bloc. As early as 1992, the international community had 
established preventive peacemaking and peace-building2 operations 
in Macedonia to monitor the situation and support the new 
democracy.3 The UN’s deployment of troops to Macedonia from 
1992 to 1999 played a key role in preventing a spillover of violence 
from Macedonia’s Balkan sisters,4 but the Macedonian government 
consistently resisted “interference by the UN in sensitive internal 
matters, especially interethnic relations.”5 The UN struggled to 
stabilize internal ethnic tensions through a “good offices”6 mandate 
 
 1. In 1993, the United Nations admitted “Macedonia” as a member state under the 
provisional name of “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (“FYROM”) due to a 
dispute with Greece over the use of the name Macedonia. G.A. Res. 225, U.N. GAOR, 47th 
Sess., 98th plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/225 (1993). For economy, this paper will refer to the 
country as Macedonia. 
 2. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 3. See S.C. Res. 795, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3147th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/795 (1992) 
(authorizing the United Nations Protection Force to establish a presence in Macedonia). 
 4. See, e.g., ALICE ACKERMANN, MAKING PEACE PREVAIL: PREVENTING VIOLENT 
CONFLICT IN MACEDONIA 3–4, 51 (1999); ABIODUN WILLIAMS, PREVENTING WAR: THE 
UNITED NATIONS AND MACEDONIA 1–2 (2000); Stephen T. Ostrowski, Preventive 
Deployment of Troops as Preventive Measures: Macedonia and Beyond, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 793 (1998). 
 5. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 112 (emphasis added); see also infra Part II.C. 
 6. “Good offices” diplomacy constitutes efforts by third parties “to induce the 
conflicting parties to negotiate between themselves.” J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 
373 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963). Generally “good offices” refers to the 
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due to the Macedonian government’s unwillingness to address the 
roots of the conflict. The Macedonian government feared that a 
special UN good offices “delegate would act as a ‘colonial governor,’ 
an undesirable prospect for the newly independent and sovereign 
state. In short, the UN was welcome to ‘look out,’ but its decision 
to ‘look in’ was quite another matter.”7 
In a large number of post–Cold War conflicts,8 and certainly in 
the Macedonian conflict, the inability of the international 
 
prestige and clout of the officer in the world community. The term appears to have originated 
in the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907: 
[I]n order to maintain this general peace, the Signatory Powers agree to have 
recourse, as far as circumstances will allow, to the good offices or mediation of one 
or more friendly Powers . . . . 
  Powers are not more prone than individuals in controversy to listen to friendly 
advice, and they are accustomed to resent intermeddling. Between nation and 
nation the fear that the exercise of good offices and mediation may become a 
precedent and insensibly pass into a claim of intervention inconsistent with 
independence and its corollary, equality, has doubtless prevented an offer on more 
than one occasion . . . . If, however, the exercise of the offer of good offices and 
mediation be purely voluntary, and be not raised to the rank of a duty of strangers 
to decide the controversy, and if the effect of good offices and mediation be 
restricted to advice which may be accepted or rejected by either of the parties to the 
conflict, it is difficult to see how the offer, although it may be embarrassing, can 
prejudice the freedom of action of the contending parties. 
   . . . . 
  The essence of good offices consists in advice to parties in controversy to settle 
their difficulties. It precedes and calls into being negotiation, and when this is done 
good offices as such are exhausted. . . . In a word, good offices begin and end in 
counsel . . . . 
JAMES BROWN SCOTT, 1 THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCE OF 1899 AND 1907, at 256–60 
(1972). Today, the UN Secretary-General’s Office views the role of good offices diplomacy as 
“extend[ing] beyond serving as a mere go-between” to taking an “active part in the dispute 
settlement process.” Alys Brehio, Good Offices of the Secretary-General as Preventive Measures, 
30 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 589, 592 (1998). The Secretary-General views good offices 
broadly: “[to] adapt to the needs of the international community, filling a role as facilitator, 
problem-solver, and persuasive force.” Id. 
 7. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 112 (citation omitted). 
 8. Lewis Rasmussen explains: 
[I]t is the type of conflict plaguing international society today—the nature of the 
belligerents and the location of the battlefield—that poses analytical and prescriptive 
problems for scholars and foreign policy practitioners. Mass violence now is waged 
not so much by states against each other as by more amorphous groups whose 
members are contesting the states and borders that contain them. Nearly two-thirds 
of the ongoing conflicts in 1993 could be defined as “identity-based” . . . . 
J. Lewis Rasmussen, Peacemaking in The Twenty-First Century: New Rules, New Roles, New 
Actors, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS & TECHNIQUES 30 (I. 
William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997). 
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community to effectively “look in” has consistently hampered 
internal stabilization efforts. The basic question arises: How can the 
international community effectively intervene while still respecting 
national sovereignty? This paper presents a case study of post-
Communism Macedonia and posits that the seeming paradox 
between intervention and sovereignty is to some extent illusory. 
International peacemaking within a country is most successful when 
guided by a respect for national sovereignty and political 
independence. Such respect is more likely to facilitate the necessary 
peacemaking precondition of host country cooperation than is 
paternalistic intervention. When the international community acts 
overly paternalistic, it signals, at least in the mind of the “adolescent” 
nation, its “disrespect” for the nation’s sovereignty. Peacemaking 
facilitated by a UN good offices mandate should center first on 
understanding the conflicting incentives, goals, and motivations; 
second, on formulating diplomacy strategies that account for these 
factors—including perception correction and attitudinal structuring 
approaches; and third, on actually mediating the conflict. This paper 
analyzes the Macedonian civil conflict under these premises and uses 
simple game theory to demonstrate the importance of developing 
disciplined and informed good offices missions. 
Part II provides background on the situation in Macedonia prior 
to the 2001 hostilities and delineates the UN’s efforts to stabilize 
internal strife in the country through a good offices mandate. Part 
III investigates the pertinent events of the 2001 ethnic Albanian 
uprising and describes the events that ultimately catalyzed 
negotiations over ethnic Albanian grievances and led to the Ohrid 
peace agreement. Part IV contrasts the mediation efforts of the 
Ohrid envoys with the prior efforts of the UN’s good offices mission 
by using game theory to highlight failures and successes of the 
mediation efforts. It particularly advances the continuing 
development of comprehensive good offices strategies that will make 
mediation efforts more effective in resolving internal disputes. Part V 
provides a brief conclusion. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Preface to Independence 
A detailed examination of the Macedonian region’s history of 
unremitting external domination impedes the timely development of 
this paper’s thesis. On the other hand, the reader should realize that 
by the beginning of the twentieth century, foreign oppressors had 
controlled the region for so long that the notion of a distinct, 
autonomous Macedonia was more of a fantasy than a reality. Prior to 
declaring independence in 1991, there had not been an independent 
Macedonian state since the times of Philip of Macedon and 
Alexander the Great—over 2300 years ago.9 For more than two 
ensuing millennia after the empire’s collapse, the Macedonian region 
endured an incredible “history of violence and external domination,” 
which calls to mind “the image of the region as a center of 
intractable conflict, and of the ‘Macedonian Question,’ which 
[preoccupied] European statesmen in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century.”10 In fact, when contrasting modern Macedonia’s 
 
 9. Ackermann explains: 
[T]he contemporary Republic of Macedonia was part of the Macedonian Empire in 
the fourth century B.C. under Philip II (reigned 359 B.C.–335 B.C.) and his son, 
Alexander the Great (reigned 336 B.C.–323 B.C.). The Macedonian Empire was a 
vast geographic area that included most of the present day Republic of Macedonia, 
Kosovo, Albania, southern Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, and Iran. 
ACKERMANN, supra note 4, at 53–54. 
 10. Id. at 53. After the demise of Alexander the Great’s ancient Macedonian empire, the 
Roman, Byzantine, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Ottoman Empires each took turns dominating 
portions of what is now modern-day Macedonia. During the sixth and seventh centuries A.D., 
the Slavs and Bulgars moved into the region where they found mostly a Greek-speaking 
population, but by the end of the ninth century two Greek missionaries “undertook the 
conversion of the Slavs to Christianity, and also developed the first written Slavic language.” 
Id. at 54; see also Elisabeth Barker, The Origin of the Macedonian Dispute, in THE NEW 
MACEDONIAN QUESTION 7–8 (James Pettifer ed., 1999). At this same time, the Slavs and 
Bulgars began challenging the rule of Byzantium over the Macedonian region. “Macedonia, or 
parts of it, were alternately under Bulgarian or Byzantine rule until the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries.” Barker, supra, at 8. Macedonia then fell under the rule of the Serbian 
tsars who, at one point, made Skopje the capital of the Serbian kingdom. In the last half of the 
fourteenth century, the Turks conquered the Serbian Kingdom and ushered in 500 years of 
Ottoman rule in the Macedonian region. As in prior occupations of Macedonia, the Ottoman 
Empire dramatically contributed to the ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity of the region. 
See ACKERMANN, supra note 4, at 54. 
As the Ottoman Empire faded in the late nineteenth century, Bulgaria, Greece, and 
Serbia also “staked out claims to Macedonian territory, justifying them on historical, linguistic, 
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remarkably peaceful transition to statehood with the violent 
insurgences in other Balkan nations, readers unfamiliar with the 
region may be surprised that James Pettifer characterizes the 
questions of Macedonian identity and territory as “the most bloody, 
complex and intractable of all” the Balkan disputes.11 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, Macedonia’s 
history continued to cloud its claims to autonomy as foreign 
occupation in the region remained the norm.12 By the end of World 
 
and ethnic grounds.” Id. In 1878, the Russo-Turkish war ended, liberating the lower Balkan 
region from Constantinople. Under the Treaty of San Stefano, Russia, who advocated a 
“Greater Bulgaria” to offset the Austro-Hungarian Empire, allowed Bulgaria to claim a 
substantial portion of Macedonia. “This gave Bulgaria enormously inflated frontiers which 
have haunted Bulgarian nationalist dreams ever since—even, perhaps, the dreams of Bulgarian 
Communists. It awarded her nearly all Slav Macedonia, including Vranje, Skopje, Tetovo, 
Gostivar, the Black Drin, Debar, and Lake Ochrid . . . .” Barker, supra, at 9. Within four 
months, however, the Treaty of Berlin displaced the Treaty of San Stefano and extinguished 
“Greater Bulgaria” by ceding the Macedonian region back to Turkey. By the early 1890s, an 
Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (or “VRMO,” which is the Macedonian 
abbreviation and is interchangeable with IMRO) was formed in Bulgaria in an effort to free 
Macedonia from Turkish oppression. Today, VRMO-DPMNE, the Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization Democratic Party of National Unity, is the main contemporary of 
the organization started in 1893. Soon after its original formation, the VRMO movement 
fractured, with some advocating independence from Turkey and annexation into Bulgaria and 
others supporting an independent Macedonian state. See id. at 10. Macedonia’s neighbors still 
had “burning grudge[s] and undamped [irredentist] ambitions,” Barker, supra, at 9, and did 
not recognize the existence of a Macedonian State, but they did support the VRMO’s 
“guerrilla movements in an effort to gain control of Macedonia.” WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 19. 
 11. James Pettifer, The New Macedonian Question, in THE NEW MACEDONIAN 
QUESTION 15 (James Pettifer ed., 1999). 
 12. In 1912, Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro joined forces and succeeded in 
freeing Albania and Macedonia from Turkish rule. In 1913, however, a second Balkan War 
ensued over the fate of “reclaimed” territories that pitted Bulgaria against Greece, Serbia, 
Montenegro, and Romania. As a result of the Treaty of Bucharest, the Macedonian region was 
divided as spoils of war: Greece received about 51% (Aegean Macedonia), Serbia 39% (Vardar 
Macedonia), Bulgaria 9% (Pirin Macedonia), and Albania received a 1% slice. WILLIAMS, supra 
note 4, at 19–20. By this time, Macedonia had “changed hands” so many times that 
none of the three Balkan States apparently ever thought that Macedonia, once 
liberated from the Turks, should be independent or autonomous. That may have 
been because after forty years of their three-sided cultural, ecclesiastical, and armed 
struggle for power in Macedonia, none of the three could imagine the existence of a 
genuinely independent Macedonia free from outside intervention. 
Barker, supra note 10, at 12. 
During World War I, Bulgaria allied with the Central powers and was able to occupy 
most of Vardar Macedonia, but after the Central powers were defeated the territory was 
incorporated into the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (what would become 
“Yugoslavia”). The Serbian Kingdom subjected both Slav and Albanian Macedonians to 
“repressive policies of Serbianisation and assimilation,” commonly referring to Macedonia as 
“South Serbia.” WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 20. During World War II, the Vardar region once 
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War II, however, the sentiment and political climate in the region 
facilitated Josip Tito’s rise to power and the creation of a quasi-
independent Macedonia in the Yugoslav Federation where 
Macedonia enjoyed “equal status to that of the other five federal 
entities: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and Bosnia-
Herzegovina.”13 From the outset, Tito recognized that Macedonia’s 
troubled history weakened Macedonia’s claims as a republic, so he 
devised a systematic plan to strengthen the Macedonian identity, 
including the formation of an independent Macedonian Church, the 
development of new Macedonian history textbooks, and the 
development of a new alphabet and language.14 From World War II 
until the collapse of the Iron Curtain, Tito’s Yugoslavia held 
together remarkably well,15 but “[t]he extent to which Tito 
succeeded in developing a separate Macedonian national identity 
would be tested during the dissolution of Yugoslavia.”16 
By 1991, Tito’s Yugoslav Federation was dissolving rapidly. 
Following the lead of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, Macedonia held 
a referendum for independence. Virtually all who voted supported 
the creation of an independent Macedonian state,17 and Macedonia’s 
 
again was occupied by Bulgaria for the Axis powers. While welcomed at first, many 
Macedonians soon viewed the Bulgarian occupation as “insensitive and corrupt.” Id. 
 13. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 20. 
 14. Id. at 21. 
Tito’s recognition of the Macedonian nationality and creation of a separate 
Macedonian republic within the Yugoslav federation, served to set apart the Slavs 
living there from Bulgarians and Serbs, a fundamental [tenet] of his Yugoslav nation 
building program. Tito thus undermined Bulgarian territorial claims by reinforcing 
that Macedonians were a separate nationality and blocked Serbia from claiming that 
Macedonians were part of the “Greater Serbian” nation that had dominated 
interwar Yugoslavia politically and demographically and that had sought to 
Serbianize Macedonia in the interwar period. 
Id. (quoting Duncan M. Perry, Crisis in the Making? Macedonia and Its Neighbors, 43 
SÜDOSTEUROPA 34–35 (1994)). 
 15. Ackermann attributes Yugoslavia’s remarkable post-war cohesion to “Tito’s 
charisma[,] authoritarian leadership style, . . . an intricate political system of federalism, social 
and economic equality, and group and national rights, including ‘shared sovereignty among its 
many nations.’” ACKERMANN, supra note 4, at 55 (quoting SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN 
TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR 22 (1995)). 
 16. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 21. 
 17. Seventy-two percent of the eligible voters actually voted and ninety-nine percent 
favored Macedonian independence. Id. at 23. By February 1992, Macedonian President 
Gligorov successfully negotiated with Yugoslav President Milosevic for the withdrawal of the 
Yugoslav National Army (“JNA”) from Macedonia, and by April 1993 the UN admitted 
Macedonia as its 181st member. See G.A. Res. 225, supra note 1. 
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parliament subsequently adopted a new constitution guaranteeing 
“the rule of law, a democratic political system, and individual 
rights.”18 At long last, Macedonia achieved independence and 
nationhood. But while the new constitution marked the beginning 
of a new era in Macedonian history, it fueled old questions of 
identity and territory. Externally, Macedonia feared the possible 
irredentist designs of its neighbors—the historically so-called “four 
wolves.”19 Internally, the government saw increases in ethnic 
Albanian nationalism as inapposite to a strong, united Macedonian 
identity and feared implosion by factionalism.20 To fortify its claims 
to sovereignty and independence, the Macedonian government made 
rational choices about how to address each threat. First, the country 
had virtually no military force and was completely vulnerable to 
invasion.21 President Kiro Gligorov responded by requesting 
international assistance to fortify Macedonia’s borders. Second, the 
new government viewed ethnic Albanian issues as internal concerns 
which if legitimized would undermine the new republic’s stability 
and territorial claims. Hoping not to legitimize possibly nationalistic 
claims, the government responded by minimizing ethnic grievances 
in favor of a united Macedonian identity. Therefore, as the 
international community became involved in Macedonia, it 
addressed the potential external and internal sources of conflict with 
various degrees of success. The international community was highly 
successful in managing external aggression, yet it struggled to deal 
effectively with internal sources of conflict. 
B. 1991–1999: Managing External Threats to Macedonian Statehood 
1. Preventive deployment in Macedonia 
In December 1992 at Macedonia’s request, the UN approved 
the first and, to date, only deployment of a purely preventive force.22 
 
 18. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 23. 
 19. The four wolves are Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia. See Pettifer, supra note 
11, at 17. 
 20. Feeling left out and overlooked in the nationalization process, the ethnic Albanian 
population boycotted the 1991 referendum and did not support the adoption of the new 
Macedonian constitution. 
 21. See supra note 17. 
 22. The end of the Cold War and the rise of ethnic violence, especially in the Balkan 
region, forced the UN to “reconceptualiz[e] the measures available to the United Nations in 
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One month earlier, Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov asked the 
UN to position a military force in Macedonia in order to protect the 
country from possible spillover of other Balkan conflicts and from 
any irredentist designs of Macedonia’s neighbors—the four wolves.23 
The Security Council dispatched an exploratory group of observers 
 
maintaining international peace and security.” Ostrowski, supra note 4, at 794. Zartman notes 
that post Cold War conflicts generally “have not been the kind of classic interstate conflicts 
over causes such as boundaries, territory, hostile regimes, or resources. . . . [C]onflicts do tend 
to become regionalized, not by unbridled aggression but by ‘contamination’ . . . .” I. William 
Zartman, Toward The Resolution of International Conflicts, in PEACEMAKING IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS & TECHNIQUES 5 (I. William Zartman & J. Lewis 
Rasmussen eds., 1997). 
In 1992, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali issued An Agenda for Peace, which provided 
the UN a progressive and adaptive framework of analysis for dealing with modern conflict. An 
Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the 
Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security 
Council on 31 January 1992, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. A/277- 
S/24111 (1992) [hereinafter Agenda for Peace]. This approach uses a set of integrally related, 
ad hoc measures in order to “resolv[e] the issues that have led to conflict.” Id. ¶ 15. These 
measures include preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peace-keeping, and peace-building. 
The United Nations has developed a range of instruments for controlling and 
resolving conflicts between and within States. The most important of them are 
preventive diplomacy and peacemaking; peace-keeping; peace-building; 
disarmament; sanctions; and peace enforcement. The first three can be employed 
only with the consent of the parties to the conflict. Sanctions and enforcement, on 
the other hand, are coercive measures and thus, by definition, do not require the 
consent of the party concerned. Disarmament can take place on an agreed basis or in 
the context of coercive action under Chapter VII. 
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the 
Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 50th 
Sess., ¶ 23, U.N. Doc. A/60-S/1995/1 (1995) [hereinafter Supplement to an Agenda for 
Peace]. 
To establish clear definitions for this paper, preventive action and peacemaking are 
aimed at “prevent[ing] conflicts through early warning, quiet diplomacy and, in some cases, 
preventive deployment.” Id. ¶ 26. Peace-keeping involves the deployment of military or police 
forces to control conflict between hostile parties. See Agenda for Peace, supra, ¶ 20. Peace-
building or state-building involves “institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, 
the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development.” 
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, supra, ¶ 48. Peace-building “requires integrated action and 
delicate dealings between the United Nations and the parties to the conflict in respect of which 
peace-building activities are to be undertaken.” Id. ¶ 47. 
Under these guiding principles, the UN sanctioned the use of preventive deployment as 
a means of conflict prevention. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, A Grotian Moment, 18 FORDHAM 
INT’L L.J. 1609, 1615 (1995). “Preventive deployment was not foreseen by the international 
community, but it is grounded in international law. It was devised by the application of 
elements of the law heretofore not brought together.” Id. 
 23. Letter Dated 23 November 1992 from the Secretary-General to the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/24851 (1992). 
LUD-FIN 5/31/2003 1:18 PM 
761] Desktop Publishing Example 
 769 
to Macedonia24 and based on the findings of the mission, the 
Secretary-General recommended that part of the United Nations 
Protective Force (“UNPROFOR”) be stationed “on the inside of 
the Republic’s borders with Albania and Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro) with an essentially preventive mandate of monitoring 
any developments which could undermine stability.”25 Based on this 
report, the Security Council passed resolution 795, which authorized 
the deployment of international troops in Macedonia and, in reality, 
acted as more of a symbolic barrier to spillover of Balkan aggression 
rather than an actual military blockade.26 The preventive mission 
would be small—one infantry battalion and thirty-five UN 
observers27—because the Macedonian government “did not expect 
the United Nations to defend its borders. It was the presence of 
United Nations forces that was most important.”28 In May 1993, the 
 
 24. Letter Dated 25 November 1992 from the President of the Security Council to the 
Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/24852 (1992). 
 25. 1992 U.N.Y.B. 386, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.1; see also Report of the Secretary-General 
on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, U.N. Doc. S/24923 (1992) [hereinafter 
Report of the Secretary General on the FYROM]. UNPROFOR was setup in Croatia in February 
of 1992. Until 1995, the missions to Bosnia, Croatia, and Macedonia were all under 
UNPROFOR central command. S.C. Res. 743, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3055th mtg., ¶ 2, 
U.N. Doc. S/RES/743 (1992). 
The Secretary-General also recommended that UN civilian police (“UNCIVPOL”) be 
sent to keep an eye on the Macedonian border police because of increased ethnic tensions 
caused by the killing of several ethnic Albanians who had attempted to cross the border 
illegally. 1992 U.N.Y.B. 386, U.N. Sales No. E.93.I.1; see also Report of the Secretary-General 
on the FYROM, supra, ¶ 4. “However, unlike the military deployment, that proposal had not 
yet been accepted by the authorities of the former Republic.” 1992 U.N.Y.B., supra, at 386. 
The Security Council therefore instructed Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to seek the 
permission of the government and “deploy the police monitors immediately upon receiving the 
consent of the Government.” S.C. Res. 795, supra note 3, ¶ 3. The Macedonian government 
contested the need for the UNCIVPOL, arguing that “the internal situation was stable [and 
e]thnic concerns were being dealt with through dialogue and negotiation.” Report of the 
Secretary-General on the FYROM, supra, Annex 1, ¶ 13. Macedonia’s reluctance to the 
presence of UNCIVPOL is indicative of the government’s consistent efforts to distance the 
UN and other international actors from meddling in internal affairs. Although the government 
eventually conceded to the presence of UNCIVPOL as “the price it had to pay for UN troops 
on its borders,” the lack of enthusiasm the government had for solving internal problems 
consistently hampered the international community’s efforts to conduct peacemaking 
operations in Macedonia. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 49. 
 26. S.C. Res. 795, supra note 3. 
 27. Report of the Secretary-General on the FYROM, supra note 25, Annex 1, ¶ 30. 
 28. Id. ¶ 21. After a series of both informal and formal requests, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden agreed to provide military personnel to form a joint Nordic battalion (“NORDBAT”) 
that would contribute to the preventive force. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 46–47. 
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United States joined the international effort and committed troops 
to the region as “a chance to limit the conflict.”29 The Secretary-
General viewed United States involvement in Macedonia as a key 
development, stating that the “tangible support offered [by] United 
States deployment will further strengthen confidence and stability in 
[Macedonia] and underscore the message that the international 
community will not accept any further widening of the tragic conflict 
in the region.”30 
With the one exception of adding a good offices mandate,31 the 
goals of the UN mission remained constant throughout the duration 
of the mission: (1) to monitor Macedonia’s northern and western 
borders; (2) to fortify the country’s security and stability by acting as 
a deterrent to potential aggressors; and (3) to report any threats to 
the country.32 In 1995, however, an important change occurred in 
the structure of the preventive mission—the Macedonian mission 
was separated from the Bosnian and Croatian missions.33 Macedonia 
desired an independent mission from the outset, but the political 
circumstances were not conducive to such a request until Croatia 
threatened to withdraw support for UNPROFOR in 1995.34 Seeing 
an opportunity, Macedonia requested that the UN establish separate 
peacekeeping missions since 
 
 29. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Says It Will Send 300 Troops to Balkan Republic to Limit Strife, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1993, at A1. 
 30. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 795, ¶ 24, 
U.N. Doc. S/26099 (1993). Secretary of State Warren Christopher remarked that “these 
troops underscore the seriousness of our warning to Belgrade and the Bosnian Serbs. This offer 
of U.S. troops to the UN has both symbolic and tangible significance [in the region].” Warren 
Christopher, U.S. Leadership After the Cold War: NATO and Transatlantic Security, Address 
Before the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, (June 10, 1993), 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1993/9306/930610dossec.html. 
The value of the peacekeepers lay not in their strength or their arms but in their 
presence. They symbolized the interest of the United Nations in Macedonia and 
signaled that it was off-limits to potential aggressors. Equally important, they were a 
trip wire and could not be attacked with impunity. Their message was simple: 
“Hands off Macedonia.” 
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 42. 
 31. See infra Part II.C. 
 32. See Report of the Secretary-General on the FYROM, supra note 25, ¶¶ 3–4; id. Annex 
1, ¶ 12. 
 33. See S.C. Res. 983, U.N. SCOR, 50th Sess., 3512th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/983 
(1995). 
 34. See Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 4 of Security Council 
Resolution 947, ¶¶ 4–5, U.N. Doc. S/38 (1995). 
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Macedonia had not been involved in the war in the former 
Yugoslavia and therefore [it] was not sustainable politically that the 
UN’s mission in the country should be a part of UNPROFOR. 
[Furthermore,] UNPROFOR’s preventive mandate in Macedonia 
was different from its mandates in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Croatia, and the success of the UN’s first preventive deployment 
mission warranted greater recognition.35 
In a March report to the Security Council, Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali recommended that UNPROFOR be separated into 
three separate operations and the Security Council subsequently 
approved the changes.36 Macedonia believed that the creation of a 
UN Preventive Deployment (“UNPREDEP”)37 mission would 
accomplish at least three important objectives: (1) an increased 
emphasis on “Macedonia’s status as an independent and sovereign 
state”; (2) greater direct attention from UN headquarters; and (3) an 
increase in the “amount of local procurement in Macedonia, [which 
would boost] the weak local economy.”38 These objectives highlight 
Macedonia’s rational behavior in forwarding the country’s goal of 
unchallenged independence and sovereignty. First, based on the 
history of the region and the post–Iron Curtain climate, Macedonia 
legitimately feared the intentions of its Balkan neighbors. Second, 
Macedonia’s dilapidated military force could not withstand a 
spillover of violence into the country. Third, Macedonia recognized 
that increased international attention and recognition of 
Macedonia’s statehood and territory would disarm and deter many 
of the external threats to the country’s independence. Therefore, 
Macedonia’s solution—a request for UNPREDEP—responded to 
Macedonia’s rational, self-interested realization that it could not 
manage the external threats without international help. In large part, 
UNPREDEP successfully managed external threats because of this 
realization and the Macedonian government’s willingness to 
cooperate. 
 
 35. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 76. 
 36. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 947 (1994), 
¶¶ 84–85, U.N. Doc. 34, S/222 (1995); S.C. Res. 983, supra note 33. 
 37. For simplicity, this paper will hereinafter use the term UNPREDEP to refer to the 
UN’s entire preventive mission in Macedonia, including the periods when the mission was 
technically under the UNPROFOR mandate. 
 38. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 76. 
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2. UNPREDEP’s success in holding the four wolves at bay and 
containing violent ethnic spillover 
An unfortunate reality in international conflict resolution is that 
“failure by international institutions seems to command greater 
attention than success.”39 While this paper seems to follow suit by 
focusing on the international community’s apparent challenges in 
addressing Macedonia’s internal threats, this paper fully recognizes 
the significant successes that UNPREDEP achieved. While it is 
difficult to draw “but-for” conclusions in any situation, one may 
likely conclude that during its seven-year existence UNPREDEP 
served at least two important purposes: (1) it stifled any irredentist 
designs of Macedonia’s neighbors,40 and (2) it prevented the physical 
spillover of violence from greater Balkan conflicts. The mission sent a 
clear message that the international community recognizes and 
supports the development of a strong, independent Macedonian 
nation. In addition, this paper’s subsequent analysis of UN good 
offices diplomacy in Macedonia benefits from the recognition that 
UNPREDEP strengthened Macedonia’s territorial security through 
the UN’s and Macedonia’s cooperative orientation.41 Both parties’ 
objectives were aligned, which facilitated cooperation instead of 
competition. In contrast, the UN’s attempts to assist Macedonia 
with internal problems were met with grudging acknowledgement.42 
While this paper focuses on the failures of the UN good offices 
mandate, it does so to emphasize the continuing need to develop 
models of peacemaking that nurture host-country cooperation. 
 
 39. Id. at 1. 
 40. Although a detailed examination of the history of Macedonia is beyond the scope of 
this paper’s thesis, the “Macedonian fear of the ‘Four Wolves’ which surround the country” 
was legitimate. Pettifer, supra note 11, at 17. Although Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia 
express “that they have no claim on Macedonian territory, there are substantial political 
parties . . . who do have claims over Macedonian territory or who want a revision of the 
position of their compatriot minorities.” Id.; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 52–59, 71–
75; WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 25–30. 
 41. See RICHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF 
LABOR NEGOTIATIONS 184 (1965). In particular, the concept of attitudinal structuring, 
discussed infra Part IV.B. provides important guidelines for developing effective good offices 
strategies. See generally id. at 184–90. A cooperative attitude between two parties is 
characterized by “complete acceptance of the legitimacy of the other,” “full respect for the 
other,” and “mutual trust and a friendly attitude between the parties generally.” Id. at 188. 
 42. See id. at 186. When there is a competitive orientation, however, “[r]ecognition of 
the legitimacy of the other party could be characterized as ‘grudging acceptance.’” Id. 
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Otherwise, good offices diplomacy will be frustrated and inept. In 
Macedonia’s case, the internal threats to stability, which were widely 
recognized as likely more dangerous than external threats,43 were 
never effectively solved and consequently failed to prevent rebel 
fighting in 2001. The challenge—and seeming paradox—is 
determining how to stay out of Macedonia’s internal affairs enough 
to respect the country’s sovereignty while still exerting enough 
influence to help the country create lasting democratic institutions. 
C. 1991–1999: Managing Internal Threats to Macedonian Statehood 
The major source of internal conflict in Macedonia originates 
from the deep-rooted tensions between Slavic Macedonians and 
ethnic Albanians. Under Tito’s leadership, the Yugoslavian federal 
system granted Macedonia “republic” status and encouraged it to 
construct a national identity as a counterbalance to Bulgarian and 
Serbian claims over Macedonian identity.44 Ultimately though, 
creating this Macedonian identity “clashe[d] with the need 
of Macedonia’s ethnic minorities, especially the ethnic Albanians, to 
maintain their cultural identity. The more Slavic Macedonians 
assert[ed] their cultural identity, the more ethnic Albanians fe[lt] the 
need to assert theirs, leading to a vicious circle.”45 
1. The UN Secretary-General’s good offices 
By 1994 Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali realized that “the 
internal [ethnic] situation in [Macedonia] . . . could prove to be 
more detrimental to the stability of the country than external 
aggression.”46 This judicious assessment of the Macedonian situation 
marked a shift in UNPREDEP’s emphasis. Rather than playing a 
merely passive and monitoring role, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 
recommended that the Security Council authorize a good offices 
 
 43. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993), ¶ 37, 
U.N. Doc. S/300 (1994); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1058 (1996), ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. 
S/961 (1996); Jonathan Eyal, From Bad to Worse to Bosnia, THE SPECTATOR, June 17, 1995, 
at 10. 
 44. See ACKERMANN, supra note 4, at 65–66. 
 45. Id. at 66. 
 46. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993), supra note 43, ¶ 
37. 
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mandate to Macedonia.47 From this point forward, the UN joined 
the OSCE and several other prominent international actors in 
“devot[ing] considerable attention to strengthening dialogue 
between the political forces and [assisting] in monitoring human 
rights and inter-ethnic relations.”48 
Under advisement from the Secretary-General, the Security 
Council adopted Resolution 908 in March of 1994.49 The language 
of the mandate “encourage[d] the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for [Macedonia] . . . to use his good offices as 
appropriate to contribute to the maintenance of peace and stability 
in that Republic.”50 An important legal limitation of the good offices 
role was, however, that “[l]egally and politically [Macedonia’s] 
request for, or at least acquiescence in, United Nations action [was] 
a sine qua non.”51 Macedonia fell into a catch-22: 
 The government was not enthusiastic about the good offices 
mandate. It viewed “good offices” as a menacing formula for the 
UN to interfere in the country’s internal affairs. The government 
also believed that the implementation of international standards on 
the treatment of ethnic minorities, which was advocated by 
regional and international organizations, would contribute to the 
disintegration rather than the consolidation of the Macedonian 
state. Nonetheless, the Macedonian government resigned itself to the 
good offices mandate as the price it had to pay for the political 
legitimization and security provided by UNPREDEP.52 
Therefore, although the Special Representative’s good offices 
mandate had been “approved” by Macedonia, the government 
viewed the mandate with reservation, apprehension, and 
resentment.53 Since the UN had to exercise good offices diplomacy 
 
 47. See id. 
 48. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1058 (1996), supra note 43, ¶ 22. 
 49. S.C. Res. 908, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3356th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/908 (1994). 
 50. Id. ¶ 12. As has been noted in other literature, “use of the term ‘as appropriate’ . . . 
left a large degree of discretion to local force commanders as to how to execute most 
beneficially the preventive mandate.” Ostrowski, supra note 4, at 820; see also Thomas M. 
Franck & Georg Nolte, The Good Offices Function of the UN Secretary-General, in UNITED 
NATIONS, DIVIDED WORLD: THE UN’S ROLES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 143, 174 
(Adam Roberts & Benedict Kingsbury eds., 2d ed. 1993). 
 51. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, supra note 22, ¶ 28. 
 52. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 109–10 (emphasis added). 
 53. See id. at 112, 135, 141. 
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with the cooperation of the authorities of the host country, 
Macedonia often complied by going through the motions of the 
good offices function without obligating itself to meaningful reform 
and negotiation.54 This lack of meaningful peacemaking caused some 
groups to criticize the UN’s efforts: “In the name of stability . . . 
both the U.N. and the OSCE tend to defend the status quo in 
Macedonia and downplay human rights violations within the 
country. Only gentle criticism is directed against a friendly 
government that is seen as a stabilizing force.”55 These criticisms 
describe the practical limitations on a good offices mandate—that 
one commissioned to use good offices diplomacy must maintain 
respect for the host country’s sovereignty and independence while 
trying to influence a reluctant government into developing stable 
democratic institutions. 
Viewed differently, this limitation may be the actual strength of 
good offices mediation. Since the UN good offices diplomacy is 
unfettered by any particular methodology, UN mediators have the 
flexibility to structure their efforts to each particularized situation. 
Consequently, good offices activities can be ad hoc, adapting to 
needs as they arise.56 Additionally, international law assures the host 
country that a UN good offices mandate will not become 
overbearing. Since good offices activities require, at the very least, 
acquiescence by the host country,57 the host country occupies the 
driver’s seat. In this position, UN good offices mediations serve as a 
navigator and advisor in guiding the host country on the road to 
democratization. Developing this sort of cooperative and 
information-sharing relationship with the UN, a host country can 
make better institution-building decisions because it has access to 
valuable expertise that the country can adapt to fit its particular social 
and ethno-historic challenges. UN good offices in Macedonia failed, 
however, to develop this type of cooperative attitude in addressing 
internal strife. In part, the UN is responsible because its exuberance 
 
 54. See S.C. Res. 908, supra note 49, ¶ 12. 
 55. Human Rights Watch, A Threat to “Stability”: Human Rights Violations in 
Macedonia, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Macedoni.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2003). 
 56. “Good offices are informal, loosely structured, and, to a large extent, depend on the 
flexibility, sensitivity, and imaginativeness of the good officer. The successful good officer thus 
usually demands the authority to operate within a wide margin of discretion.” Franck & Nolte, 
supra note 50, at 174. 
 57. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, supra note 22, ¶ 28. 
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and paternalism often signaled in the minds of the Macedonian 
government that the UN did not trust Macedonia’s decision-making 
abilities. 
2. Macedonian-Albanian tensions 
In Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s view, the authorization of a 
good offices mandate in Macedonia represented a measured and 
preventive response to the rise of ethnic nationalism in the region, 
especially in view of the bloody ethnic wars in other republics of the 
Yugoslav Federation. The UN hoped to avert the escalation of ethnic 
tension into a Bosnian-like conflict. By 1994, ethnic relations were 
already on edge in Macedonia due to ethnic Albanian political and 
social criticisms of the country. Several issues plagued Slav-Albanian 
relations in Macedonia, which are discussed in the following text. 
a. Group recognition and territorial independence. Early divisions 
began when the ethnic Albanians boycotted the Macedonian 
referendum for independence in 1991 “because of concern that they 
would not be counted accurately.”58 At the time, Slav Macedonians 
defended certain poll practices by asserting that not all ethnic 
Albanians in Macedonia have citizenship rights because of heavy 
immigration from Kosovo and other regions of former Yugoslavia.59 
In response, the Albanians “accused the government of passing 
deliberately restrictive citizenship laws that have discriminated 
against ethnic Albanian [immigrants].”60 By January 1992, this 
increasing ethnic Albanian nationalism and self-awareness stimulated 
an Albanian referendum on territorial autonomy. While the 
 
 58. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 23. Ethnic Albanians disputed the results of 1991 
census, which put the ethnic Albanian population at approximately 22% and the ethnic 
Macedonian population at approximately 66%. Many ethnic Albanians believe that they 
account for between 30% and 40% of the population. ACKERMANN, supra note 4, at 61. 
According to the 1994 census, Macedonia has 1.94 million citizens: 66.5% are ethnic 
Macedonians, 22.9% are ethnic Albanians, 4% are ethnic Turks, 2.3% are Roma, 2% are ethnic 
Serbs, 0.4% are Vlachs, and 1.8% of the population belongs to other ethnic groups. See 
WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 32. Ethnic Albanian leaders dispute the results of the 1994 census 
“alleg[ing] that the census was plagued with technical and legal irregularities and that the 
results were suspect as no ethnic Albanian was employed in the Government Statistical Office.” 
Id. at 33. Their complaints, however, further discredited their motives in the eyes of Slav 
Macedonians because the census was “financed, monitored, and partly organized by the 
European Union and the Council of Europe.” Id. at 32. 
 59. See ACKERMANN, supra note 4, at 61. 
 60. Id. 
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Macedonian government condemned the referendum and 
pronounced it illegal, “it signaled to many Macedonians that ethnic 
Albanians were not willing to coexist in a common state.”61 In short, 
the referendum raised fears of a “Greater Albania” movement that 
would attempt to unite Albania with parts of Macedonia and 
Kosovo. After the UN deployed UNPREDEP in Macedonia, this 
threat subsided considerably and “[b]y 1996, more vocal ethnic 
Albanian politicians . . . [had] reframed the quest for territorial 
autonomy into ‘internal self-determination,’ with structures more 
representative of ethnic Albanians.”62 
b. Discrimination. Ethnic Albanian grievances concerning status 
and self-determination related closely to concerns over 
discrimination. Thus, throughout the 1990s, ethnic Albanian leaders 
emphasized the need for constitutional and governmental reform. 
They resented the language of the Macedonian constitution that 
described Macedonia as the “national state of the Macedonian 
people.”63 Even though the government claimed that the 
constitution’s language of “guaranteeing . . . human rights, citizens’ 
freedoms and ethnic equality”64 demonstrated the constitution’s 
focus on the citizens and not the nation, “ethnic Albanians . . . 
maintain[ed] that this implie[d] a second-class status for non-Slavic 
citizens.”65 Another sticking point centered on the under-
representation of ethnic Albanians “particularly in the armed forces, 
in the police, in the legal professions, and in political office.”66 
Although the government has made efforts to balance ethnic 
minority compositions, “ethnic Albanians [have] continue[d] to 
demand wider representation in all areas of Macedonian society.”67 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 61–62. 
 63. MACED. CONST. (Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991) pmbl. 
 64. Id. 
 65. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 23–24. 
 66. ACKERMANN, supra note 4, at 63. 
 67. Id. 
  Since 1990, the government has appointed from four to five ethnic Albanians 
to any given cabinet and has allowed ethnic Albanians to form their own political 
parties and to operate their own television, radio, and newspapers. Nevertheless, 
many ethnic Albanians claim that they continue to be underrepresented . . . . For 
example, only 3 percent of police officers, and only 7 percent of military personnel 
are ethnic Albanian. However, the government continues to take positive steps 
toward integration, appointing two ethnic Albanian justices to the Constitutional 
Court (out of nine) and increasing the number of ethnic Albanians on the Supreme 
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c. Language and education. Controversies over language and 
education rights also correlated with ethnic Albanians’ “demands for 
greater political participation and representation.”68 A major 
complaint was that the constitution established “[t]he Macedonian 
language, written using its Cyrillic alphabet, [as] the official language 
in the Republic of Macedonia.”69 The government answered many of 
the language issues during the 1990s,70 but ethnic Albanians “have 
continued to press the Macedonian government to address . . . 
recognition of the Albanian-language University of Tetovo [and] 
recognition of Albanian as a second official language.”71 In 1994, a 
group of academics proposed to establish an Albanian-language 
University of Tetovo that would “provide adequate training to a 
sufficient number of teachers responsible for teaching in Albanian 
primary and secondary schools.”72 The ethnic Albanian population 
believed that such a university was vital due to the low acceptance 
rate of ethnic Albanian students at Macedonian language schools. 
However, the Macedonian government opposed the university 
project fearing that it would lead to increased ideological division 
within the country. After a series of protests and demonstrations over 
the issue, the government adopted compromise legislation, including 
a quota system for ethnic Albanian admissions to Macedonian 
language schools and an increased ethnic Albanian curriculum at 
such schools.73 To ethnic Albanians, the compromises have been less 
than satisfying, and they wonder “[h]ow can a state succeed when 
one part of its population is educated, while the other is semi-
literate?”74 
 
Court from one to four (out of sixteen). In addition, one ethnic Albanian was 
promoted to general in the army and three ethnic Albanians were appointed 
ambassadors. The proportion of ethnic Albanian cadets at the military academy also 
increased from 2 to 12 percent, and the proportion of ethnic Albanian officers rose 
from an overall low of 0.1 percent in 1992 to 3 percent in 1995. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 68. Id. at 91. 
 69. MACED. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 70. See ACKERMANN, supra note 4, at 91. 
 71. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 33. 
 72. Id. at 118. 
 73. See ACKERMANN, supra note 4, at 91–92. 
 74. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 119 (quoting FLAKA E VËLLAZËRIMIT, Nov. 17, 1994 
(the FLAKA E VËLLAZËRIMIT is an Albanian newspaper)). 
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3. The solving power of the good offices mandate 
In a 1995 report, the Secretary-General described the good 
offices mandate as having “made a modest but important 
contribution to helping . . . to maintain peace and stability and build 
a workable future.”75 In retrospect, the modesty of the contribution 
seems even more apparent. The Macedonian government did not 
want a good offices mandate but went along with it as “the price it 
had to pay for a continuation of the deployment of UN troops along 
its borders.”76 The government’s go-through-the-motions attitude77 
did not facilitate meaningful UN mentoring because under the 
tenets of international law, good offices activities had to be 
conducted “in cooperation with the authorities of the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.”78 Because of Macedonia’s 
tolerating, rather than cooperating, mind-set, many of the UN good 
offices accomplishments related more to Track-Two type conflict 
resolution instead of Track-One diplomacy.79 While these Track-Two 
efforts were valuable, they failed to penetrate official governmental 
levels in a way that stimulated the direct resolution of ethnic 
tensions. In Macedonia’s case, ethnic Albanian grievances centered 
on problems with constitutional, political, governmental, and social 
institutions—issues that ultimately have to be resolved by official 
dialogue.80 
 
 75. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 947, supra 
note 36, ¶ 80. 
 76. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 112. 
 77. Walton and McKersie might describe Macedonia’s attitude as accommodative. See 
WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 41, at 187. 
 78. S.C. Res. 908, supra note 49, ¶ 12. 
 79. “Track One consists of the mediation, negotiations, and other official exchanges 
between governmental representatives.” Louis Kriesberg, The Development of The Conflict 
Resolution Field, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS & TECHNIQUES 
51, 60 (I. William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997). Track-Two diplomacy “denotes 
unofficial, informal interaction directed toward conflict resolution among members of 
adversarial groups or nations.” Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution, in 
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS & TECHNIQUES 239, 261 (I. 
William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997); see also Joseph V. Montville, 
Transnationalism and the Role of Track-Two Diplomacy, in APPROACHES TO PEACE: AN 
INTELLECTUAL MAP 255 (W. Scott Thompson et al. eds., 1991). 
 80. This paper focuses on the UN’s struggle to initiate a meaningful Track-One 
negotiation between the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanians. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to discuss the many efforts at diplomacy that were conducted by the OSCE, the 
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, The Working Group, U.S. Agency for 
International Development (“USAID”), U.S. Institute of Peace, and others. See, e.g., 
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The most notable good offices contributions included 
monitoring the 1994 elections, helping contain the University of 
Tetovo crisis, and promoting unofficial dialogue.81 But despite the 
UN’s attempts at persuasion, the Macedonian government still 
proved unwilling to directly negotiate over many of the ethnic 
Albanian substantive demands. It feared that conceding on some 
issues would fuel nationalism, further divide the country, and 
legitimize ethnic Albanian claims to territorial autonomy. In certain 
instances, such as the 1994 election, “[t]he government’s willingness 
to invite the UN to [participate in easing ethnic tension] on the basis 
of the good offices mandate, which it resented, was the result of 
practical political considerations of self-interest.”82 “The government 
understood clearly the significance of credible elections for internal 
stability and its own international standing. . . . [And it] saw a useful 
role for the good offices function that it had not expected when it 
was authorized by the Security Council.”83 
Additionally, the UN did serve a role in trying to promote 
dialogue in the University of Tetovo crisis, but when the situation 
became increasingly political, UNPREDEP “was unable to get the 
Macedonian government and the ethnic Albanians to find a 
permanent solution to the dispute.”84 The UN had to walk a fine 
line—making sure not to support the ethnic Albanian’s grievances 
but also disassociating itself from the government’s policies. Any 
appearance of choosing sides would have disastrous effects on the 
balance of the country. The situation limited the UN’s effectiveness 
in promoting a long-lasting solution to the problem.85 During 
 
ACKERMANN, supra note 4, at 104–11; ORG. FOR SEC. AND CO-OPERATION IN EUR., 
ARTICLES OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING CSCE SPILLOVER MONITOR MISSION TO 
SKOPJE, http://www.osce.org/skopje/mandate/files/agreement.pdf (Nov. 7, 1992); U.S. 
AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., FIELD REPORT: MACEDONIA NOVEMBER 2001, http://www.usaid. 
gov/hum_response/oti/country/macedon/rpt1101.html (Nov. 2001). The peace-building 
activities of these organizations have all contributed to the development of the Macedonian 
democratic system but ultimately fell short of redressing the institutional roots of ethnic 
conflict. 
 81. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 112–44. 
 82. Id. at 116. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 130. 
 85. Williams notes: 
The government was becoming increasingly sensitive to the role of international 
organizations in trying to improve the country’s troubled interethnic relations. 
There was a growing belief in its ranks that external mediators should not be 
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UNPREDEP’s mission, the UN also organized a series of informal 
monthly meetings aimed at “promot[ing] dialogue among the 
various political forces.”86 These meetings did begin some important 
dialogue between political parties, but participants generally avoided 
controversial issues and focused on issues “which all political leaders 
could support irrespective of ideology or ethnic affiliation.”87 
Ultimately the process failed to solve important ethnic issues.88 
There is no question that the UN’s presence in Macedonia was 
vital. Although the good offices mandate was generally unsuccessful 
in brokering negotiations on ethnic issues, the international 
community’s presence in the country certainly had a deterring and 
mediating effect against a violent escalation of the situation. In the 
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 
articulated: 
Collectively Member States encourage the Secretary-General to 
play an active role in [preventive diplomacy]; individually they are 
 
involved in resolving internal problems. Moreover, the government had been 
criticized by the extraparliamentary nationalist parties, VRMO-DPMNE and the 
Democratic Party, for what they viewed as its over readiness to comply with the 
dictates of international institutions. 
Id. at 129. 
 86. Id. at 130. 
 87. Id. at 131. 
 88. In early February 1999, a letter written by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of Macedonia was forwarded to the Security Council. In the letter, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs presented Macedonia’s arguments for a further extension of UNPREDEP in 
light of the neighboring military conflicts in Kosovo. See Letter Dated 29 January from the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Addressed to the 
Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/108/Annex (1999). A resolution to extend the mission for six 
months was drafted, but China blocked the extension, and on February 28, 1999, 
UNPREDEP’s mandate expired. The withdrawal of forces also extinguished any further good 
offices activities in the country. “China said that it had voted against the draft resolution 
because it had always maintained that UN peacekeeping operations, including preventive 
deployment missions, should not be open-ended.” 1999 U.N.Y.B. 371, U.N. Sales No. 
E.01.I.4. While this argument has some merit, most members of the Security Council 
considered China’s veto inappropriately timed in light of the Kosovo situation and China’s 
reasoning pretextual in light of Macedonia’s newly established diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 173–74. Whatever China’s reason, the withdrawal of 
UNPREDEP appeared premature since no formal demarcation of the Macedonia-Yugoslav 
border had been reached and the hostilities in Kosovo were escalating. See 1999 U.N.Y.B. 370, 
U.N. Sales No. E.01.I.4. In the following months, several hundred thousand Kosovar refugees 
fled over the Macedonian border (about ninety percent of Kosovo’s population is ethnic 
Albanian). NATO subsequently intervened and likely prevented a physical spillover of violence 
into Macedonia, but Macedonia did not avoid the influence of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(“KLA”) and the spillover of ethnic nationalism. 
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often reluctant that he should do so when they are a party to the 
conflict. It is difficult to know how to overcome this reluctance. 
Clearly the United Nations cannot impose its preventive and 
peacemaking services on Member States who do not want 
them. . . . The solution . . . may lie in creating a climate of opinion, 
or ethos, within the international community in which the norm 
would be for Member States to accept an offer of United Nations 
good offices.89 
The dilemma as described by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali 
depicts the situation in Macedonia accurately. Even though 
Macedonia had technically allowed the good offices mandate, the 
government’s resentment of the mandate hindered internal 
peacemaking. The government was reluctant to cooperate with the 
good offices mandate because, in their view, doing so undermined 
the new nation’s independence and sovereignty. The more the UN 
pushed Macedonia to address ethnic issues, the more the 
government viewed the UN’s good offices as inapposite to self-
government. As noted, only when the Macedonian government 
viewed the good offices mandate as compatible with its “political 
considerations of self-interest” did the country cooperate with the 
UN internal stabilization efforts.90 The good offices mission may 
have been more successful by refocusing its efforts to first understand 
the government’s self-interested considerations. With a better grasp 
of the Macedonian viewpoint, the UN would have been in a better 
position to correct misinformation and cultivate attitudes of 
cooperation, legitimacy, trust, and friendliness91—attitudes that are 
preconditions for effective mediation. Instead, the UN jumped to 
the last step and attempted to address “problems” the Macedonian 
government felt were under control. Even though the UN was 
correct in its assessment of the internal ethnic situation in 
Macedonia,92 the good offices mission neglected to consider the 
legal limitation on their activities—host country cooperation. As a 
result the good offices mandate ended up fortifying Macedonia’s 
 
 89. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, supra note 22, ¶ 28. 
 90. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 116. 
 91. See WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 41, at 185–190. 
 92. “[T]he internal [ethnic] situation in [Macedonia] . . . could prove to be more 
detrimental to the stability of the country than external aggression.” Report of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993), supra note 43, ¶ 37. 
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initial fears that the UN would act like a colonial governor.93 When 
ethnic Albanian militants began an armed uprising in 2001, however, 
Macedonia soon became obliged to cooperate with the international 
community and address ethnic grievances. In this case, Macedonia’s 
incentives changed because of key developments in the armed 
conflict. 
III. 2001: THE OUTBREAK AND RESOLUTION OF HOSTILITIES 
A. Brokering Peace 
By the end of February 2001, rebel uprisings had begun along 
the Macedonia-Kosovo border in an effort to secure greater rights 
for ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. Over the next few weeks, the 
conflict spread through the northern border cities and included 
clashes in Tetovo, Macedonia’s second largest city. The Macedonian 
government viewed the violence as terrorism and “determined to 
crush ethnic Albanian guerrillas” whom it viewed as separatists using 
demands for greater rights as a ploy to advance a “greater Albania.”94 
During the first month of conflict, the government was successful in 
pushing back the rebels and restoring limited peace to the country 
but at a cost of some civilian casualties. With a temporary abatement 
of the hostilities, the international community stepped up its 
distanced admonitions for peace to active participation in the 
process. 
Initially, the United States took a back seat to the European 
Union (“EU”) in trying to resolve the fighting between the 
government and ethnic Albanian forces. The EU called upon the 
ethnic Albanians to begin a meaningful dialogue with the 
government95 and “two senior foreign policy officials, Javier Solana 
 
 93. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 112. 
 94. Macedonia Ready to “Crush” Rebels, BBC NEWS: WORLD EDITION, Mar. 15, 2001, 
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1223601.stm. The international community 
consistently condemned using extremist violence “as a means of achieving goals in the 
Balkans.” Armed Attacks on the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Strongly Condemned, 
NATO UPDATE, Mar. 26, 2001, at http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/ 
0319/e0319a.htm. Ironically, however, even though the UN and NATO clearly supported 
the established Macedonian government, they used the rebel fighting as a catalyst for bringing 
Macedonia to the negotiating table to discuss persistent Albanian grievances. 
 95. See EU Calls For Dialogue in Macedonia, BBC NEWS: WORLD EDITION, Mar. 27, 
2001, at http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1244661.stm. 
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and Chris Patten, [took] a hand in all party talks . . . designed to 
meet the grievances of the Albanian minority.”96 The EU 
emphasized that the officials would “not be leading the talks, only 
trying to act as facilitators”;97 however, Solana and Patten’s positions 
were clear: they “condemn[ed] the violence of the Albanian 
guerrillas and support[ed] the territorial integrity of Macedonia. 
Both also call[ed] for further reforms in building a multi-ethnic 
society and extending minority rights, in order to isolate the 
extremists.”98 
By early April, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson had 
coordinated NATO’s efforts in the region with the EU peace envoy. 
He openly condemned the rebel uprisings and stressed the need for 
political dialogue to prevent further hostilities.99 Some progress was 
made in April, but the main ethnic Albanian opposition party 
boycotted the peace talks and “threatened to pull out of the 
government unless its demands [were] met within a month.”100 
Significantly, the Macedonian government had begun to realize that 
“the grievances of the Albanian minority [had] to be addressed”101 
and substantial progress was made toward that end. However, on 
April 28, a rebel attack killed eight Macedonian security officials, and 
several other subsequent attacks ultimately dismantled the peace 
talks.102 In early May, the Macedonian army launched a new 
offensive to counter the ethnic Albanian attacks, and hostilities 
escalated during the next several weeks.103 Unable to come to an 
agreement on peace, the hostilities continued throughout May and 
 
 96. Analysis: The EU’s Role in Macedonia, BBC NEWS: WORLD EDITION, Apr. 2, 2001, 
at http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/europe/1256788.stm. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Lord Robertson Calls for Intensified Political Dialogue in the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, NATO UPDATE, Mar. 26, 2001, at http://www.nato.int/docu/ 
update/2001/0326/e0326a.htm; Nato Promotes Macedonia Peace Talks, BBC NEWS: WORLD 
EDITION, Apr. 4, 2001, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1259500.stm. 
 100. Nato Promotes Macedonia Peace Talks, supra note 99. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See Attack Shakes Macedonia Talks, BBC NEWS: WORLD EDITION, Apr. 30, 2001, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1305125.stm. 
 103. See Macedonia Army Begins Offensive, BBC NEWS: WORLD EDITION, May 3, 2001, 
at http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/europe/1310372.stm. 
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triggered increased concern over the probability of civilian 
casualties.104 
By June, two main factors helped push through a peace 
agreement: (1) the government realized its “military’s response to 
the crisis was largely inept. Inheriting an extremely weak military 
structure . . . , Macedonia’s military took a long time to organize its 
counteroffensive, which emboldened the Albanian fighters”;105 and 
(2) the international community “feared that the botched military 
campaign would plunge Macedonia into civil war.”106 In short, the 
Macedonian conflict became ripe107 for resolution and compromise. 
Macedonia did not want civil war because that would ignite 
discussion over the territorial independence of the ethnic Albanian 
community. Furthermore, the weak Macedonian army could not 
assure a quick victory. Macedonia’s incentives to cooperate with the 
international community changed quickly. Now the EU, NATO, 
and UN diplomats held vital bargaining chips that could pressure 
Macedonia to address some of the ethnic Albanian grievances. 
On June 14, 2001, President Boris Trajkovski requested 
NATO’s help in “implementing a peace plan aimed at restoring 
peace and stability in his country.”108 NATO agreed to conduct a 
demilitarization of the ethnic Albanian rebels but only after several 
preconditions were met. One condition required that a “political 
agreement be signed by the main Parliamentary leaders.”109 To reach 
 
 104. See Concern Grows for Macedonia Civilians, BBC NEWS: WORLD EDITION, May 27, 
2001, at http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1353968.stm. 
 105. BRENDA PEARSON, PUTTING PEACE INTO PRACTICE: CAN MACEDONIA’S NEW 
GOVERNMENT MEET THE CHALLENGE? 2 (2002), http://www.usip.org/pubs/ 
specialreports/sr96.pdf (last visited May 9, 2003). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Luca Renda explains: 
 Scholars often use the term “ripeness” to describe the right moment for initiating 
external intervention in a civil war. A conflict is deemed to be ripe for resolution 
when one or more of the combatants begin to fear the consequences of continuing 
the war. This situation can also occur when the conflict is in a phase of a “mutually 
hurting stalemate,” that is, when none of the parties is capable of prevailing through 
force and all sides fear a catastrophic escalation.  
Luca Renda, Ending Civil Wars: the Case of Liberia, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Fall 1999, at 
59, 60. 
 108. NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, Statement Following the North Atlantic 
Council Decision to Launch Operation Essential Harvest, (Aug. 22, 2001), http://www.nato 
.int/docu/speech/2001/s010822a.htm [hereinafter Decision to Launch Essential Harvest]. 
 109. Id. 
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this end, the EU and the United States sent special envoys Francois 
Leotard and James Pardew to help mediate discussions. By July 7, 
2001, a comprehensive framework was drafted “by a group of 
foreign and Macedonian experts.”110 Mr. Leotard commented that at 
that point the document needed “reactions, comments, [and] 
amendments . . . [but] it [was] the basis for future negotiations.”111 
The strong negotiating style of the envoys soon caused contention as 
Macedonian Prime Minister Georgievski accused the mediators of 
“caving in to Albanian demands, and trying to break up the State’s 
institutions . . . . [T]he country was being threatened and 
blackmailed.”112 Finally, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was 
hammered out in August 2001 “after weeks of difficult negotiations 
in the [Macedonian] president’s villa” at the Ohrid lakeside on 
Macedonia’s western border.113 The Ohrid Framework set in motion 
a number of specific political reforms in return for an end to ethnic 
Albanian hostilities. Apparently, neither the government, nor the 
ethnic Albanian leaders were completely “happy with the 
compromise,” but the concessions were still publicized as 
“historic”—“a huge step.”114 
B. The Solving Power of the Ohrid Agreement 
In contrast to the UN good offices mission, the Ohrid 
Agreement directly responded to the major complaints of the ethnic 
Albanians.115 The obvious difference between the two mediation 
 
 110. Macedonia’s Leaders Given Key Draft, BBC NEWS: WORLD EDITION, July 7, 2001, 
at http://news.bbc.co. uk/2/hi/europe/1427792.stm. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Row Over Macedonia Peace Plan, BBC NEWS: WORLD EDITION, July 19, 2001, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1446149.stm. 
 113. Macedonia’s Year of Peace, BBC NEWS: WORLD EDITION, Aug. 13, 2002, at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/2191418.stm. 
 114. Id. The Ohrid agreement “comprise[s] an agreed framework for securing the future 
of Macedonia’s democracy and permitting the development of closer and more integrated 
relations between the Republic of Macedonia and the Euro-Atlantic community.” Ohrid 
Framework Agreement, Aug. 13, 2001, http://president.gov.mk/eng/info/dogovor.htm 
[hereinafter Ohrid]. The terms of the agreement provide both general statements of policy and 
specific reform goals and respond roughly to many of the demands that ethnic Albanian have 
voiced since 1991. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 115. See supra Part II.C.2. The following sections describe Ohrid’s provisions and 
demonstrate their correlation with the ethnic Albanian demands. 
Peace provisions. Ohrid’s peace terms reflect a commitment to NATO’s four 
preconditions for its participation in the peace plan. First, an enduring cease-fire. Second, an 
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efforts was that in the Ohrid negotiations the presence of a hurting 
stalemate changed Macedonia’s incentives to cooperate with ethnic 
Albanians. Interestingly, ethnic Albanian hostilities did not impose 
the hurting stalemate per se. Rather, the government realized that it 
would likely be “unable to defeat the rebels by military means” 
 
agreement on a solution to the political and social problems of the country. Third, an “agreed 
plan for weapons collection, including an explicit agreement by the ethnic Albanian armed 
groups to disarm.” Decision to Launch Essential Harvest, supra note 108. Fourth, a status of 
forces agreement (“SOFA”) with Macedonia and assent to the “conditions and limitations 
under which the NATO forces [would] operate.” Ohrid, supra note 114, § 2.1. 
Basic principles. The agreement sets forth broad statements of policy that are intended to 
guide political and social dialogues between citizens of Macedonia. The statements offer 
starting points and general guidelines for strengthening democracy in Macedonia. Section 1.1 
rejects the “use of violence in pursuit of political aims.” Id. § 1.1. Section 1.2 states firmly that 
Macedonia’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity” are not on the negotiating table—“[t]here 
are no territorial solutions to ethnic issues.” Id. § 1.2. Importantly, however, the agreement 
recognizes the importance of “preserv[ing]” a “multi-ethnic” Macedonia by continually 
making sure that “its Constitution fully meets the needs of all its citizens and comports with 
the highest international standards.” Id. §§ 1.3–1.4. The agreement further appreciates that 
“[t]he development of local self-government is essential for encouraging the participation of 
citizens in democratic life, and for promoting respect for the identity of communities.” Id. § 
1.5. 
Nondiscrimination. The Framework acknowledges the principle of nondiscrimination 
with respect to employment in the public sector. It specifically mandates that authorities “take 
action to correct present imbalances in the composition of the public administration, in 
particular through the recruitment of members of under-represented communities.” Id. §§ 
4.1–4.2. As part of this commitment, the Agreement commits to “ensuring that the police 
services will by 2004 generally reflect the composition and distribution of the population of 
Macedonia.” Ohrid Annex C, § 5.2. To begin this process, “500 new police officers from 
communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia will be hired and trained by 
July 2002.” Id. 
Decentralized government. In response to consistent ethnic Albanian complaints, the 
Agreement commits to adopting a new federalism regime by revising laws on local self-
government. The Agreement proposes to enlarge the responsibilities and competencies of local 
elected officials in the areas of “public services, urban and rural planning, environmental 
protection, local economic development, culture, local finances, education, social welfare, and 
health care.” Ohrid § 3.1. By the terms of the agreement, the Macedonian Assembly was 
required to adopt the new law on local self-government within forty-five days of the signing. 
Id. § 8.1. 
Language and education. The Framework agreement recognizes Macedonian as the 
official language throughout Macedonia but also provides that “any other language spoken by 
at least 20 percent of the population is also an official language.” Id. §§ 6.4–6.5. Additionally, 
there are provisions for the use of other official languages in local municipalities, for the right 
to translation of judicial proceedings, and for the issuance of official documents in official 
languages other than Macedonian. Id. §§ 6.7–6.8. Instruction in primary and secondary 
schools will “be provided in the students’ native languages” and “[s]tate funding will be 
provided for university level education in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the 
population of Macedonia.” Id. §§ 6.1–6.2. 
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because of the country’s limited military capabilities after the 
withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army in 1992 and the militants’ 
access to arms from Kosovo.116 The situation forced Macedonia to 
listen, albeit reluctantly, to the same type of advice that the UN tried 
to give repeatedly via its good offices mission: international 
recognition of Macedonia as a stable democracy requires a 
responsible resolution of ethnic difficulties. As shown, good offices 
persuasion to this end fell on deaf ears. The UN’s physical presence 
in Macedonia may have forestalled violence, but UN preventive 
measures aimed at Macedonia’s internal situation did little to redress 
the roots of the conflict. 
The situation created by the ethnic uprisings changed the 
Macedonian government’s paradigm, albeit in a coercive fashion. 
Likewise, developing and implementing comprehensive good offices 
strategies can influence actors’ perceptions117 and ultimately create 
incentives to negotiate with one another. Effective good offices 
strategies are thus informed by any applicable theory or scholarly 
literature. For example, in the following section, this paper evaluates 
the UN’s struggle to resolve Macedonia’s ethnic tensions under a 
game theoretic approach. While a retrospective look at the conflict 
does not provide a specific methodology for conducting future good 
offices missions or other intrastate mediations, such an analysis is a 
step toward correcting past mistakes. In the future, game theory, 
situational modeling, social-psychological theory, and similar 
theoretical and analytical tools must be used imaginatively to develop 
effective good offices strategies that will prospectively resolve 
intrastate conflicts. 
 
 116. Tony Karon, Progress and Pessimism as Macedonia Peace Plan Moves Forward, 
TIME.COM: WORLD, Sept. 6, 2001, at http://www.time.com/time/world/printout/ 
0,8816,173943,00.html (telephone interview with TIME Central Europe bureau chief Andrew 
Purvis).  
 117. In game theory terms, perceptions may be called information. Information may be 
perfect or imperfect and, depending on the situation, “players can gain if they can convince 
their opponent that they have certain attitudes or capabilities, whether they really have them or 
not.” MORTON D. DAVIS, GAME THEORY: A NONTECHNICAL INTRODUCTION 99 (rev. ed. 
1983). In Macedonia’s situation, and in the general context of UN good offices mediation, the 
parties gain when they are better informed, when there is perfect information. See id. at 98. In 
other words, “players really have [the] capabilities or attitudes” they project. Id. at 99. 
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IV. ANALYSIS: PREVENTIVE PEACEMAKING IN MACEDONIA 
In Macedonia’s case, as with a large number of post–Cold War 
conflicts,118 the inability of the international community to effectively 
“look in” hampered preventive peacemaking efforts. Former 
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali described the paradox thus: “The 
United Nations . . . now operates in a world where the major forces 
are global and internal. . . . [T]he institutions created for peaceful 
and cooperative relations among States are now needed to sustain 
the States themselves from new global and internal pressures.”119 No 
conflict is attributable to a single cause. In Macedonia, several factors 
led to the ignition of violence. Among those factors was the 
international community’s difficulty in “sustaining” the state against 
“internal pressures” out of respect for the “political independence 
and sovereignty” of the new Macedonian nation.120 
After almost a decade’s presence in Macedonia, the UN and 
other international actors were less successful in securing 
Macedonian peace than previously believed. Early peacemaking 
measures fell short of bringing about strong social institutions that 
could deal with and resolve internal ethnic difficulties. The question 
then arises: How can the international community effectively respect 
a state’s sovereignty and influence democratic institution building in 
order to solve ethnic and internal tension before violence breaks out? 
In solving contemporary conflicts, William Zartman suggests that 
there may be a greater need not to respect sovereignty in the interest 
of peace: 
Since contemporary conflicts tend to be internal, the legitimacy of 
intervention is questionable. In a democratic age, people are 
sovereign and they get the government they deserve. . . . The weak 
international law that does exist protects the sovereignty of states 
and their internal affairs from foreign interference, and for good 
reason: Relaxing the inhibitions on internal interference leaves 
power unrestrained and invites the strong to overrule the weak. 
 
 118. See surpa note 8 and accompanying text. 
 119. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 22, at 1609. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali further 
explained that even though international conflicts have changed, “the principles of the United 
Nations laid out in Article 2 of the Charter—respect for the territorial integrity of Member 
States, preservation of the political independence and sovereignty of Member States, and the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force—remain valid and must be upheld.” Id. 
at 1610. 
 120. See id. at 1609–10. 
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The prohibition also protects would-be intervenors from 
involvement in cultures and arenas that are not their own. 
Ultimately, all these arguments are half-sound, reasoned justifications 
for inaction that are trumped by the need for action and 
responsibility.121 
Zartman’s approach to conflict management—that responsibly 
dealing with conflict may mean trampling on sovereignty to some 
degree—has strong theoretical foundations in cases where violent 
conflict has already erupted, such as the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia or 
Rwanda.122 Harder questions arise when deciding if “the need for 
action and responsibility” may also trump sovereignty considerations 
if violence has not broken out, as was the case in Macedonia.123 
Heeding the warning signs of “protracted social conflict” facilitates 
early action and international responsibility in preventing identity-
based violence;124 however, such action must be tempered by respect 
for the political independence and sovereignty of the state. In theory, 
this respect for political independence was the foundation for the 
good offices mandate,125 but in practice an overly paternalistic UN 
signaled, at least in the mind of “adolescent” Macedonia, a degree of 
“disrespect” for the nation’s sovereignty and its ability to solve its 
own problems. Stephen Ostrowski explained that “formal consent 
[to a good offices mandate] may be inadequate if the parties to the 
dispute are still unwilling to address the underlying causes of conflict 
and resolve matters peacefully and constructively.”126 In this case, the 
UN’s first mistake was authorizing a good offices mandate before 
consulting with Macedonia. The government viewed this ostensibly 
harmless act as meddlesome paternalism. The UN never overcame 
Macedonia’s impressions of the good offices mandate. In fact, many 
of the UN’s subsequent actions may actually have fortified the 
 
 121. Zartman, supra note 22, at 7 (emphasis added). 
 122. For example, both international norms and the UN Charter justify military action 
for cases of genocide and human rights violations. See U.N. CHARTER art. 42. 
 123. See Zartman, supra note 22, at 7. 
 124. See Rasmussen, supra note 8, at 32. “[P]rotracted social conflict . . . is characterized 
as bitter, hostile, interaction among groups, where hatred, political and economic oppression, 
and other forms of victimization (perceived or actual) run along ethnic or other identity-based 
lines and periodically flare up in acts of extreme violence.” Id. 
 125. “Legally and politically [a country’s] request for, or at least acquiescence in, United 
Nations action is a sine qua non.” Supplement to an Agenda For Peace, supra note 22, ¶ 28. 
 126. Ostrowski, supra, note 4, at 857–58. 
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government’s initial unwillingness to let the international community 
help with internal affairs. 
A. The Good Offices Game 
Game theory is an expansive discipline. In fact, “[t]here really [is 
not] a ‘theory’ of games; there are in fact many theories. The nature 
of the ‘game,’ just like the nature of ordinary parlor games, is 
determined by the ‘rules.’”127 The primary rules of the good offices 
game have been expressed repeatedly: “[R]espect for the territorial 
integrity of Member States, preservation of the political 
independence and sovereignty of Member States, and the 
inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force . . . must be 
upheld.”128 UN good offices activities rely upon the authorization or 
acquiescence of the host country.129 Therefore, when the 
international community acts overly paternalistic it signals, at least in 
the mind of the “adolescent” nation, its “disrespect” for the nation’s 
sovereignty. Such action has negative effects on the country’s 
willingness to cooperate with the good offices mandate, no matter 
how sound the advice. 
After declaring independence from Yugoslavia, Macedonia had 
two major goals for strengthening its independent and sovereign 
democracy: (1) to protect its borders from real irredentist threats, 
and (2) to not recognize ethnic Albanian nationalism in a way that 
would legitimize claims for territorial autonomy or a “Greater 
Albania.” The UN also wanted to strengthen Macedonia’s 
independent and sovereign democracy. The UN agreed with 
Macedonia with regard to handling external threats and assisted by 
deploying UNPREDEP. With regard to internal threats to stability, 
the UN obviously believed that ignoring ethnic Albanian grievances 
undermined the principles of democracy. Obviously, the ultimate 
goals of both the Macedonian government and the UN were 
harmonious—the establishment of a peaceful, sovereign, and 
democratic state. However, views about how to accomplish this goal 
fundamentally conflicted. If we model the tension between the UN 
and Macedonia’s peacemaking strategies in game theoretic terms, we 
get the following matrix: 
 
 127. DAVIS, supra note 117, at xiv–xv. 
 128. Boutros-Ghali, supra note 22, at 1610. 
 129. See Supplement to an Agenda For Peace, supra note 22, ¶ 28. 
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Using the assumptions and beliefs of both parties on how to 
strengthen Macedonia’s sovereignty and independence, the 
Macedonian government’s preferences from least favorable to most 
favorable were: (1) respond to the ethnic Albanian complaints with 
the help of UN good offices; (2) respond to the ethnic Albanian 
complaints in their own way; (3) keep the status quo but tolerate the 
good offices function in order to get border protection; or (4) keep 
the status quo without any good offices meddling. 
The UN’s preferences from least favorable to most favorable 
were: (1) no good offices mandate and a continuing Macedonian 
commitment to the status quo; (2) a continuing Macedonian 
commitment to the status quo coupled with the authorization of a 
good offices mandate that could potentially influence the 
government; (3) a Macedonian response to the ethnic Albanian 
complaints with the help of UN good offices; or (4) a self-initiated 
Macedonian response to ethnic Albanian grievances.130 
As demonstrated, the Nash equilibrium131 of the game accurately 
predicted the real life situation in Macedonia—the UN authorized a 
 
 130. Some may argue that the UN’s preferences (3) and (4) should be reversed. This 
argument reflects the common perception of the UN as a meddlesome parent that always 
wants to give “adolescent” states guidance and advice. While the UN certainly will proffer such 
advice when asked, the UN would prefer to let states solve their internal problems, at least 
within the confines of international law and norms. Therefore, the ordered preferences are 
correct because if Macedonia chose to respond to ethnic grievances, it would be superfluous 
for the UN to have a good offices mandate and against their best interest.  
 131. The Nash equilibrium of the game is the upper right solution in bold in Figure A. A 
Nash equilibrium is the solution where no one player can move unilaterally and improve his 
position. 
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good offices mandate and Macedonia resisted responding to ethnic 
Albanian grievances. In addition, the good offices game is not a 
simultaneous game. Each actor regularly interacted and 
communicated. Consequently, both the UN and Macedonia signaled 
to each other information about the other’s goals and preferences. 
For example, the UN recognized that “the internal situation in 
[Macedonia] . . . could prove to be more detrimental to the stability 
of the country than external aggression.”132 Rather than first 
discussing the situation with the government in an informal manner, 
the UN authorized a good offices mandate and then asked 
permission to conduct it. If the UN would have realized that the 
government believed that recognizing the ethnic Albanian grievances 
would undermine a strong Macedonian state, then the UN first 
could have addressed the conflicting presumptions about democracy 
building and concluded that good offices diplomacy directed at 
ethnic tensions would be unfruitful without incentives to cooperate. 
Instead, the UN pressed forward with the good offices mandate. 
This action may have actually fortified Macedonian preferences to 
keep the status quo. 
When a parent tells an adolescent something in the wrong way, it 
does not matter how wise the advice, the adolescent will resist taking 
the advice. Such tactless paternalism signals, at least in the 
adolescent’s mind, a lack of confidence in the independence and 
decision-making ability of the child. Macedonia likely resented the 
good offices mandate for this same reason. The government viewed 
such handholding as contrary to its main goal of strengthening 
independence and sovereignty—that is, its self-government. The UN 
good offices mission would have benefited by first understanding the 
conflicting parties’ incentives, goals, and motivations. By spending 
time trying to understand the policies behind state action, the UN 
will develop more effective strategies for encouraging democratic 
institution building. 
The logic of this analysis obviously only applies to situations 
similar to this case study. As mentioned, “[l]egally and politically [a 
country’s] request for, or at least acquiescence in, United Nations 
[preventive] action is a sine qua non.”133 Therefore, member states 
that request UN good offices already have at least some incentive to 
 
 132. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993), supra note 43, ¶ 37. 
 133. Supplement to an Agenda For Peace, supra note 22, ¶ 28. 
LUD-FIN 5/31/2003 1:18 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Year 
794 
cooperate with the UN in solving internal problems.134 In other 
situations where UN involvement has been authorized without a 
good offices mandate, such as peace-keeping, peacemaking, or 
preventive deployment, the UN should not authorize good offices 
hastily. There is a temptation to prematurely engage in good offices 
activities because the UN identifies a problem, has a tool to “fix it” 
in its toolbox, and wants to get to work. The host nation may 
legitimately believe that there is no problem, that the problem must 
be handled with a distinctively national tool, or that the situation 
requires any number of alternative responses. For this reason, 
peacemaking must center first on understanding the actors’ 
situational motivations and incentives. In a simplified way, 
understanding Macedonia’s incentives to cooperate after several 
months of fighting ethnic Albanian rebels allowed the international 
community to pressure the Macedonian government into 
negotiations. 
After the escalation of the 2001 hostilities in Macedonia, the 
government was forced into a type of hurting stalemate. The 
government realized that it would likely be “unable to defeat the 
rebels by military means”135 and that it had to rely on NATO to help 
disarm the ethnic Albanian rebels. Interestingly, Macedonia’s 
dilemma did not bring it to the negotiating table. Rather, NATO 
recognized Macedonia’s vulnerable position and therefore 
commanded a strong bargaining position. As one condition of 
NATO’s participation, NATO forced the government to come to a 
political solution over ethnic Albanian grievances. In game theory 
terms, NATO gave Macedonia an ultimatum that effectively limited 
the country’s strategic options.136 The diagram below represents the 





 134. UN paternalism in this situation can prompt, however, a later reluctance to fully 
cooperate with good offices activities. 
 135. Karon, supra note 116. 
 136. An ultimatum or threat is designed “to change someone’s behavior: to make that 
person do something he or she would not do otherwise.” DAVIS, supra note 117, at 101. If 
the threat is credible and “carried out, it will presumably be to the detriment of the party that 
is threatened.” Id. 
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NATO’s preconditions, as reflected in Ohrid, “reinforced” 
Macedonian commitment to respond to ethnic Albanian grievances 
by making the other alternatives unattractive. Civil war would clearly 
undermine Macedonia’s goal of creating a stable, sovereign nation. 
The dilemma Macedonia faced clearly brought the government to 
the negotiating table. Regrettably, it did so after a seven-month 
conflict, “resulting in about 200 casualties and more than 180,000 
internally displaced people.”137 It is clear that the hurting stalemate 
instigated more institutional change in response to ethnic Albanian 
grievances than any of the good offices activities. That, of course, is 
only a start because although Macedonian leaders “grudgingly” 
accepted and committed to Ohrid, they “ha[d] no real desire to 
reward the Albanians for bringing their country to the brink of 
war.”138 Because the hurting stalemate essentially forced 
constitutional and other reforms upon the government, many 
officials feared that “appetites for more political and economic 
advantages [would] never be satisfied . . . [and] that the real goal of 
 
 137. PEARSON, supra note 105, at 2. 
 138. Id. 
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the Albanians [was] federalization of the country”139 (recall, that this 
was the government’s premise behind not dealing with ethnic 
Albanian grievances in the first place). So an ultimatum forces 
results, but does not change the paradigm under which a conflict is 
viewed. In contrast, effective good offices diplomacy may help a 
government to reassess its policies and premises, thereby effectuating 
a paradigm shift that allows an actor to see the conflict in different 
terms. Once the mediator understands the conflicting parties’ 
incentives, goals, and motivations, he or she should formulate good 
offices strategies that account for these factors—including perception 
correction and attitudinal structuring tactics. 
B. Attitudinal Structuring 
“[A]ttitudinal structuring is a socioemotional interpersonal 
process designed to change attitudes and relationships.”140 While 
Walton and McKersie focus on labor negotiation strategy, they 
recognize the applications of their theory to “areas other than labor 
negotiations, specifically, in international relations.”141 In the 
mediation of intrastate conflicts, attitudinal structuring has two 
facets. First, the mediator or good officer must cultivate a positive 
relationship between the host country and him- or herself. Second, 
the mediator can structure the conflicting parties’ attitudes to 
improve relationships and facilitate effective negotiation. Both types 
of attitudinal structure require the consideration of several 
“attitudinal components [that] are assumed to be crucial to the 
parties’ joint dealings.” 142 These include the parties’ motivational 
orientations, beliefs about legitimacy, “feelings of trust toward the 
other,” and “feelings of friendliness-hostility toward the other.”143 
This paper does not consider further the second type of attitudinal 
structuring, which generally occurs during the actual negotiating 
process. Instead, the paper continues to focus on the relationship 
between the would-be mediator and the host country. 
A cooperative motivational orientation is necessary for effective 
good offices diplomacy. This attitude between mediator and host 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. WALTON & MCKERSIE, supra note 41, at 5. 
 141. Id. at 380. 
 142. Id. at 185. 
 143. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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country is characterized by “complete acceptance of the legitimacy of 
the other,” “full respect for the other,” and “mutual trust and a 
friendly attitude between the parties generally.”144 Creating this 
cooperative orientation requires the use of attitudinal structuring 
tactics.145 Walton and McKersie discuss two types of tactics: balance 
theory and reinforcement theory.146 Since international conflicts 
differ, no specific theory will apply in every case and mediators 
should remain open minded in their approaches; however, the 
Macedonian example suggests that balance theory may be more 
useful in the context of UN good offices missions. Balance theory 
“aim[s] at changing [the host country’s] attitudes directly and his 
behavior indirectly. Once a key attitude is changed, then a wide 
spectrum of behavioral change can be expected to occur.”147 
Applying and adapting the concepts of balance theory, the first 
attitudinal change the UN must convey is that asking for or 
accepting assistance from the international community does not 
undermine a nation’s independence or sovereignty. In situations 
similar to the Macedonian example, the UN could better serve the 
international community by presenting itself as a think tank or 
knowledge base for resolving conflict rather than an exuberant 
parent steering a wayward child.148 Changing perceptions about the 
UN “paternalism” may be part of “creating a climate of opinion, or 
ethos, within the international community in which the norm would 
be for Member States to accept an offer of United Nations good 
offices.”149 In such a climate, states would have incentives to benefit 
from the low-cost expertise of the UN in solving internal conflict. 
 
 144. Id. at 188. 
 145. See generally id. at 222–80. At this point, a mediator can engage in attitudinal 
structuring tactics because he or she has already attempted to understand the conflicting 
parties’ incentives, goals, and motivations. Walton and McKersie reiterate this point: “Before 
attitudes of trust, friendliness, and respect can be changed, one is advised to learn of their 
origin, content, and utility with respect to the given [party]. Hence, one of the important 
assignments the negotiator accepts for himself is that of analyzing the situation in terms of 
prevailing attitudes.” Id. at 223. 
 146. See id. at 223–80. “In reinforcement theory, attention is focused on [the host 
country’s] behavior.” Id. at 223. 
 147. Id. For a detailed explanation of balance theory, see id. at 224–49. 
 148. As explained in note 130, the UN’s top preference would be to not meddle in 
internal affairs and have the government initiate resolutions to internal problems. The UN 
must make better attempts at disseminating this perception. 
 149. Supplement to an Agenda For Peace, supra note 22, ¶ 28. 
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The second attitudinal change the UN should advance is that 
independent, sovereign democracies need to recognize minority 
rights. If a state wants stability, if it wants recognition in the 
international community as a democratic society, and if it wants its 
sovereignty respected, it needs to protect minority rights. The 
Macedonian–ethnic Albanian conflict demonstrates how Macedonian 
sovereignty can be strengthened in the long-term by responsibly 
addressing minority grievances. After the Ohrid Agreement, the 
extremist Albanians’ claims to autonomy were not legitimized as the 
Macedonian government feared; rather, such claims actually were 
further delegitimized: 
[The Macedonians] have nothing to lose by accepting this 
agreement. If the war was indeed launched simply to improve the 
lot of the average Albanian in Macedonia, they’re on track to get 
everything they wanted. But it will be interesting to see whether 
the National Liberation Army, or armed Albanian groups, 
disappear as the process goes forward. Because if they stick around 
and keep causing trouble, it will be clear that their agenda was 
related more to a “Greater Albania” project than to constitutional 
reform.150 
As Macedonia continues to fully implement the Ohrid 
Agreement, one of two things will happen: either (1) ethnic 
Albanian grievances will begin to disappear, or (2) the grievances will 
continue and reveal the rebels’ true motives—a “Greater Albania.” If 
the first alternative occurs, then Macedonia will have proven its 
commitment to democracy. If the second occurs, Macedonian claims 
to territorial sovereignty will be even stronger because the 
international community will not recognize the legitimacy of a 
separate Albanian Macedonian state. The UN long ago realized that 
“if every ethnic, religious or linguistic group claimed statehood, 
there would be no limit to fragmentation.”151 Unfortunately, the 
Macedonian government’s fear of ethnic Albanian secession abated, 
and is still abating, too slowly. Using attitudinal structuring and 
open dialogue, the UN good offices mission could have assured the 
government that the international community supported 
Macedonia’s sovereignty and independence. 
 
 150. Karon, supra note 116. 
 151. Agenda for Peace, supra note 22, ¶ 17. 
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Engaging in active attitudinal structuring tactics allows the UN 
to create the “climate of opinion, or ethos,”152 that will facilitate 
cooperation and meaningful intrastate conflict resolution. Because 
each state’s attitudes and motivations are based upon available 
information, be it perfect or imperfect, correcting misperceptions 
and structuring attitudes will indirectly affect the behavior of the 
host country. The UN must attempt to eradicate its paternalistic 
image by developing confidence-building strategies that 
acknowledge the government’s independence and present the UN as 
a source of expertise and intellectual capital. If successful, such a 
paradigm shift may provide incentives to use UN good offices as a 
low-cost resource for democratic institution building. States will 
begin to cooperate when they recognize the advantages of doing 
so—low-cost institution-building expertise, increased international 
respect for their political sovereignty, and recognition as a 
committed and stable democracy. In turn, the developing 
democracies will also recognize how cooperation facilitates economic 
assistance, trade concessions, and membership in international 
communities like the EU, NATO, and the World Trade 
Organization. Thus, prior to actual mediation between conflicting 
parties, a good offices mission may expend significant resources in 
building trust, legitimacy, and attitudes of cooperation and 
friendliness. After a host state and the UN begin to see eye-to-eye, 
cooperation becomes full and unrestrained and solutions to internal 
difficulties may become reality. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The UN’s good offices mission to Macedonia highlights the 
practical difficulties in mediating intrastate conflict when the host 
country maintains a tolerating or reluctant attitude toward UN 
diplomatic efforts. Because international law requires that the host 
country agree to, or at least acquiesce in, a good offices mission, in 
many instances preventive diplomacy will not be welcomed. In the 
Macedonian instance, the government reluctantly agreed to the 
good offices mandate for political reasons, but Macedonia did not 
really cooperate with the mission’s goals of ameliorating ethnic strife. 
In the future, the UN and other international mediators need not be 
 
 152. Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, supra note 22, ¶ 28. 
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powerless to effectuate change, but the mediators must not become 
frustrated when their good offices are used first to prepare the way 
for mediation, rather than to actively mediate the dispute. As a start 
to developing better preventive peacemaking strategies, UN good 
offices missions should center first on understanding the conflicting 
parties’ incentives, goals, and motivations; second, on formulating 
diplomacy strategies that account for these factors—including 
perception correction and attitudinal structuring tactics; and third, 
on actually mediating the conflict. 
David J. Ludlow 
 
